合约形式、交易规模与经济绩效——对传统中国经济停滞的微观解释  

Contractual Form,Transaction Scale and Economic Performance:A Microeconomic Interpretation of Traditional Chinese Economic Stagnation

作　　者：谢冬水[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学商学院,湖南湘潭411201

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第4期16-26,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CJL049);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(11JZD018);湖南省自然科学基金项目(13JJB005)

摘　　要：文章在关系型合约的框架下,通过一个简单的微观治理模型探讨了传统中国经济增长的动态过程。文章认为,传统中国社会主要依赖关系型合约维持社会经济的运行,而关系型合约对经济绩效的影响则受经济交易规模的限制。在传统中国经济发展的早期、经济交易规模较小时,关系型合约是一种有效的治理机制,它通过节省社会经济运行的交易成本促进经济增长。但是到了明清时期,随着经济交易规模的扩大,关系型合约的治理成本越来越高,依赖关系型合约难以有效调动资源和促成交易,导致经济陷入停滞。文章的结论为理解当前中国的经济转型提供了参考。国家如何采取政策措施以推动合约治理从关系型合约向规则型合约转变,将是中国能否成功实现经济转型的一个重要因素。Under the framework of relational contracts,this paper explores the dynamic process of traditional Chinese economic growth by using a simple microscopic governance model.It shows that traditional Chinese society mainly relies on relational contracts to maintain social and economic operation,while the impact of relational contracts on economic performance is restricted by economic transaction scale.At early stage of traditional Chinese economic development and under small economic transaction scale,relational contracts which can promote economic growth through a saving of transaction costs are the effective governance mechanism.But in the Ming and Qing dynasties,with the expansion of economic transaction scale,the governance costs of relational contracts had become more and more high, and the dependence on relational contracts could not effectively mobilize resources and facilitate transactions,thus it led to economic stagnation.This paper provides the reference for the understanding of economic transformation in current China,and how to push the transformation of contract governance from relational contracts to rule-based contracts is the key to the realization of the successful economic transformation in China.

关 键 词：关系型合约 交易规模 经济绩效 传统中国 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济]