中国地方政府合作的博弈分析:困境与消解  

Game Analysis of Cooperation Among Local Governments in China :Dilemma and Solution

作　　者：饶常林[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学湖北地方政府治理与地方发展研究中心,武汉430079

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第5期59-64,共6页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目"我国区域一体化进程中地方政府间政策协调研究"(10YJC810036);湖北省普通高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地基金资助项目(2013A03)

摘　　要：中国地方政府合作流于形式和缺乏稳定性反映了区域共同利益与地方利益博弈的困境。囚徒困境模型分析表明:困境的根源在于合作过程中机会主义的存在和短期利益的诱惑。猎鹿博弈和重复博弈分析表明:建立有效监督约束机制和合理利益分配机制,培育信任机制,坚持对背叛行为的惩罚可以战胜短期背叛利益的诱惑。推动地方政府合作向纵深发展需要发展长期稳定的合作关系,加强上级政府对地方政府合作的引导和激励,构建良好的制度环境。The formalized and unstable cooperation among China's local governments reflect a dilemma between regional common interests and local interests. Analysis of Prisoner's Dilemma indicates the root of dilemma is the existence of opportunism and the temptation of short-term interests in cooperative process. Analysis of Stag Hunt Game and Iterated Game indicates that the increase of betrayal cost and incentive of long-term interests make cooperation possible. Therefore, the in-depth development of local government cooperation calls for the development of long-term and stable cooperation, the cooperative guidance and incentive of central government, and the establishment of systemic cooperation between local governments.

关 键 词：地方政府合作 囚徒困境 猎鹿博弈 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F127