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机构地区:[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]天津财经大学理工学院,天津300222
出 处:《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2014年第5期65-70,76,共7页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71302115);天津市人文社会科学研究项目(20132141);天津财经大学科研发展基金(Y1109;Y1207)
摘 要:政府在闭环供应链的形成和运作过程中扮演着极为重要的角色。为了研究政府的回收条例对双渠道营销闭环供应链的影响,构建了条例出台前、后闭环供应链的决策模型,并以集中决策下的均衡结果作为基准,设计了一个改进的二部定价契约协调条例约束下的双渠道营销闭环供应链。通过模型之间的比较得出以下结论:政府出台的回收条例能够有效提高废旧产品的回收量;为了鼓励制造商回收,政府需设定合理的奖惩力度;随着奖惩力度的增大,制造商从协调策略中获得的收益也会增大。通过数值算例验证了结论。The government plays an important role in the formation and operation of closed-loop supply chain. To study the effects of recycling regulations on closed-loop supply chain with dual sale channels, the channel members ' decisions are analyzed before and after implementation of regulations respectively. With the equilibrium outcome under centralized decision-making as a benchmark,a modified two-part pricing contract is proposed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain with dual sale channels under the constraints of the recycling regulations.Through the comparison of the models, it is shown that the recycling regulations by the government can effectively increase the recycling quantity, while the government needs to set a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to encourage the manufacturer to recycle. With enhancement of reward and punishment, the manufacturer 's profits gained from coordination mechanisms will increase. Finally, a numerical example is applied to demonstrate the conclusions.
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