社会基本养老保险关系转移中的政府博弈行为研究  

Game Behavior between the Central Government and Local Governments in the Transfer of Old-Age Insurance Relationship

作　　者：马云超[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学公共管理学院,西安710127

出　　处：《陕西行政学院学报》2014年第4期48-51,共4页Journal of Shaanxi Academy of Governance

摘　　要：在现实经济活动中,地方政府与中央政府的利益诉求是不一致的,甚至是相互冲突的。当中央政府与地方政府双方都力图实现自身利益最大化的诉求时,双方无疑会产生利益博弈。从交易费用理论视角来看,我国现行基本养老保险制度存在的依人群设计和地区分割、画地为牢问题之所以会存在,其根源在于中央政府与地方政府间存在非均衡博弈,由此导致交易中处于最弱势地位的劳动者养老保险权益受损。In real economic activity, interest demands of local governments and the central government are inconsistent, even conflicting, when both the central government and local governments are trying to maximize their own interests demands, the two sides will undoubtedly generate interests of the game. From the perspective of transaction cost theory, China's current basic old-age insurance system exist design and region according to the crowd, the reason restricting problems exists, and its roots are in the presence of non-balanced game between the central government and local governments, resulting in workers pension rights damaged and most disadvantaged by transferring.

关 键 词：中央政府 地方政府 养老保险关系转移 博弈行为 

分 类 号：F842.67[经济管理—保险] F224.32