货币政策、负债融资与股权代理成本  

Monetary Policy, Debt Financing and Equity Agency Costs

作　　者：萧松华[1] 王院民[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融研究所与金融系 [2]中信银行广州分行

出　　处：《金融论坛》2015年第2期24-30,37,共8页Finance Forum

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272213)"货币政策波动;信贷资源配置及其经济后果研究"的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文基于货币政策的研究视角,利用中国上市公司2002~2012年的相关数据,结合考虑公司产权性质,研究不同货币政策环境下负债融资对股权代理成本的影响。研究发现:负债融资在紧缩货币政策下能有效减少股权代理成本,但与非国有上市公司相比,由于国有上市公司存在预算软约束和监督激励机制不完善等问题,负债融资抑制股权代理成本的效果在这些公司上较差;同时,短期负债降低股权代理成本的效果好于长期负债。因此,在紧缩性货币政策下,公司应调整融资结构,适当提高负债融资比例,特别是短期负债融资的比例,以降低股权代理成本,提升公司价值。From the perspectives of monetary policy and the nature of property rights of company, this paper researches the influence of debt financing on equity agency costs in different environment of monetary policy. It's found that debt financing can effectively reduce equity agency costs while tightening monetary policy is implemented, but due to the soft-budget-constraint and the imperfect supervision and incentives mechanisms, the effect of reducing equity agency costs in the state-owned listed companies is not good compared with the non-state-owned listed companies; meanwhile, the effect of short-term debt on reducing equity agency costs is better than that of long-term debt. Therefore, while tightening monetary policy is implemented, companies should adjust financing structure, namely increasing the ratio of debt financing, especially the ratio of short-term debt financing, so as to reduce equity agency costs and increase company value.

关 键 词：负债融资 股权代理成本 货币政策 公司治理 公司价值 

分 类 号：F822.0[经济管理—财政学] F832.51F275F224