机构股东持股、两权分离与关联方资产重组溢价  

Institutional Investors,the Separation of Control Right & Cash Flow Right and the Premium of Related Party Assets Reorganization

作　　者：侯剑平[1] 李媛媛[1] 倪虻[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安工业大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710032 [2]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《经济经纬》2015年第2期87-92,共6页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673054);陕西省教育厅科研基金项目(12Jk0131)

摘　　要：笔者实证研究控制股东两权分离和机构股东持股对关联方资产重组溢价率的影响,两权分离是导致上市公司治理不完善的主要原因。在控制股东通过资产重组攫取控制权私有收益时,机构股东持股可有效抑制控制股东通过关联方资产重组的掏空行为,控制股东两权分离程度和机构股东持股比例对中国上市公司关联方资产重组溢价均有显著影响。The paper empirically studies the influence of controlling shareholder’ s separation rate and institutional shareholders’ hold-ing behavior on related party assets reorganization premium in Chinese listed companies. Our study shows that the rights separation of controlling shareholder is the main cause leading to the imperfection of corporation governance in listed companies. Controlling share-holders grab private benefits through asset reorganization, and the separation rate and institutional shareholders can both effectively af-fect the premium of the related party asset reorganization by the controlling shareholders.

关 键 词：机构股东 两权分离 资产重组 关联方 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271F275