不当激励、保险销售误导与监管治理  

Perverse Incentives,Insurance Misleading Sales and Governance

作　　者：杨馥[1] 庞楷 

机构地区：[1]西安财经学院经济学院,陕西西安710100 [2]兰州财经大学金融学院,甘肃兰州730101

出　　处：《经济经纬》2015年第5期156-160,共5页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目青年项目(12CJY118);陕西省教育厅项目(2013JK0151)

摘　　要：笔者基于双重委托代理理论研究不当激励对保险销售行为的影响,结果表明:激励合约中销售佣金比例过高、支付期限不合理会导致不当激励,而消费者非理性放大了不当激励的负面效应,保险公司缺乏优化激励合约的动力,监管机构应通过限制销售佣金、完善保险销售服务评价管理等措施强化其监督约束作用,减少销售误导。This paper analyzes the influence of perverse incentives on insurance sales. The optimal choices of insurance agents,insurance consumers' and the insurers' are discussed based on dual-agent theory. And the efficient governance of insurance misleading sales is studied. It is concluded that high percentage of commissions and improper payment structure leads to perverse incentives,whose negative effects are amplified by limited cognitive level of insurance of consumers. Insurers are less motivated to optimize incentive contracts with agents. So governance should be strengthened by supervisors.

关 键 词：保险 不当激励 销售误导 监管治理 双重委托代理 

分 类 号：F842.3[经济管理—保险]