利益相关者博弈均衡与公司治理绩效  

Game Balance of Stakeholders and Management Performance of Businesses

作　　者：敬景程[1,2,3] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院 [2]公司绩效 [3]"济南现象"

出　　处：《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2004年第4期125-131,共7页Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目:区域核心竞争力的理论及其应用研究(70273024)

摘　　要：根据利益相关者理论和信息经济学与博弈论的一般原理,对公司治理参与各方利益均衡进行分析。公司治理过程中的利益相关者存在多重利益博弈关系,利益相关者的利益均衡是提高公司绩效的基本动力。"济南现象"的根本原因,是公司治理过程中利益相关者利益严重失衡,矛盾冲突长期难以有效解决所致。The author analyzes the balanced interests according to the general rules concerning stakeholder theory, information economics and game theory. In management performance of businesses, there exists multi-game-relationship of interest among stakeholders, and the balanced interest of stakeholders is the basic motivation for improving business performance. 'Jinan Phenomenon' results essentially from the serious interest unbalance of stakeholders and long-term contradictions which are no easy problems to solve.

关 键 词：利益相关者 公司绩效 “济南现象” 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]