金融监管效率的基石:激励相容的监管机制  

The Foundation of Financial Regulation Efficiency:Compatible-incentive Regulatory Mechanism

作　　者：蒋海[1] 萧松华[1] 齐洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融系,广东广州510632

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2004年第4期15-20,共6页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：暨南大学人文社科基金"银企间的融资博弈与信贷风险分析"的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文通过金融监管过程中的博弈分析 ,揭示了当前的金融监管制度安排在信息不对称条件下导致的监管当局提供有效监管激励的缺失及金融机构普遍的道德风险是造成金融监管失灵的主要原因。因而解决金融监管低效率或失灵问题的关键 ,在于通过金融市场透明度建设、监管制度安排的合理设计及金融机构治理结构的完善 ,实现社会公众、监管当局、金融机构之间的激励相容。By the means of game analysis on financial regulation process this paper reveals that it is the fault caused by the present financial supervision authority in providing effective supervision and incentive under the informational asymmetry, and the moral hazard existing generally in financial institutions that bring about the failure of financial supervision. Accordingly the key solution to the low efficiency or failure of the financial supervision is to achieve incentive compatibility among the social public, supervision authority and financial institutions by enhancing transparency of financial market improving institutional arrangement of financial supervision and ameliorating the governance structure of financial institution.

关 键 词：金融监管 博弈分析 道德风险 混业经营 中国 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]