激励性机制下输配电价格管制的定价模型  

Pricing model of power price regulation under incentive scheme

作　　者：梁劲[1] 王先甲[1] 周静[2] 周策[3] 刘坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430072 [2]武汉大学电气工程学院,湖北武汉430072 [3]国家电网公司,北京100031

出　　处：《继电器》2004年第12期1-4,共4页Relay

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60274048);湖北省自然科学基金资助项目(2001ABB047)

摘　　要：由于输配电领域属于垄断经营,输配电企业具有操纵电价的市场力,政府应对其进行严格的价格管制。政府制定公共管制价格应以受管制企业的成本为依据的,这就要求输配电企业的成本必须具有透明度和公开度,但理性的企业不会主动揭示自己的真实成本,这种信息不对称性会影响管制者的决策。从激励性机制设计的角度出发,通过建立实现社会福利最大化并满足输配电企业参与约束和相容约束的激励机制模型,这个模型能诱导输配电企业显示真实成本并能指导管制者对输配电企业实施价格监管和制定管制价格。It is necessary that the over price sectors of power transmission and distribution will be regulated by the government due to the natural monopoly of power transmission and distribution enterprises, which have market power to control electricity price. The establishment of public price is based on the costs revealed by the regulated enterprises. This requires that the costs of enterprises must be impartial and transparent. However, the rational enterprises can′t report the cost honestly, which leads to the failure of regulator's decision. In this paper, the incentive mechanism models are designed, which can induce the enterprise to report true costs and control the over price successfully. The models can meet two required conditions and maximize social welfare.

关 键 词：电力市场 电力管制 电力行业 输配电价格管制 定价模型 激励性机制 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济]