带有风险规避型销售商的供需链协调  

Supply chain coordination with risk aversion retailers

作　　者：索寒生[1] 储洪胜[1] 金以慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学自动化系,北京100084

出　　处：《控制与决策》2004年第9期1042-1044,1049,共4页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60174046).

摘　　要：以一个两阶段的供需链系统为背景,针对供需链上决策激励不一致和风险规避效应导致供需链低效的问题,研究了在实践中广泛应用的利益共享合同和批量折扣合同对供需链协调性的影响.证明了两种合同均可克服双重边际效应和风险规避效应,使得供需链协调.并给出了合同参数的设计方案,同时指出在实施上,利益共享合同需强制执行,批量折扣合同自动执行.Supply chain inefficiencies can result from incompatible incentives provided by independent decision-makers and also their risk aversion effect. The impact of revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract on the coordination of a two-stage supply chain is studied. It shows that the above two contracts can eliminate the double marginalization and risk aversion effect, and hence the supply chain can achieve coordination. Also, the parameters of the two contracts are given. Moreover, it is proved that the revenue sharing contract operates under forced compliance and the quantity discount contract operates under voluntary compliance.

关 键 词：博弈论 供需链合同 风险规避 协调 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TP14[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]