国有商业银行改革中政府效用函数的动态优化——基于租金偏好和效率偏好的选择  

On Dynamic Optimization of Government's Utility Function in the Reform Process ofState-owned Commercial Banks——An Analysis Based on Government's Preference of Rent or Efficiency

作　　者：江曙霞[1] 罗杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学金融系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经研究》2004年第11期52-62,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：以政府垄断型供给主导的国有商业银行制度变迁过程中,当直接控制国有银行的成本迅速上升时,政府效用函数将发生结构性优化,即从租金偏好向效率偏好转移。文章通过对国有银行改革的政府效用函数阶段性特征的分析,试图建立一个"二元结构两阶段"的政府效用函数模型,从而剖析我国国有银行改革的制度逻辑。In the course of institutional change of government-dominated supply of China's state-owned commercial banks, the utility function of the government will see a process of constructional optimization, that is, preference of rent will be substituted by preference of efficiency when the cost directly controlling state-owned banks quickly increases. This paper attempts to establish a 'dual structure and two-stage' government utility function through analysis of the periodical characteristics of the government utility function in the process of state-owned commercial banks reform, so as to further analyse the institutional logic of the reforms of state-owned commercial banks.

关 键 词：政府效用函数 租金偏好 效率偏好 动态优化 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]