葛梯尔反例意义的诘难  

A Critique to the Meaning of Gettier's Counter-examples

作　　者：曹剑波[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,厦门361005

出　　处：《复旦学报（社会科学版）》2004年第5期126-130,140,共6页Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

基　　金：20 0 2年度国家社科基金项目<当代知识论前沿问题研究>(编号 :0 2BZX0 4 2 )阶段性成果

摘　　要：通常认为 ,葛梯尔反例向传统知识的三元定义提出了挑战 ,并从根本上改变了当代知识论的特征。然而 ,由于 :1 .葛梯尔反例的意义是有限的 ,因为JTB定义不是全部知识的定义 ,也不是知识的重要定义 ,此外 ,葛梯尔反例也没有普遍的意义。 2 .葛梯尔反例产生的根源在于一个武断、二个混淆、三个错误的假设以及对JTB定义错误的理解。因此 ,对葛梯尔反例意义的高度评价 。Usually, people think that Gettier's counter-examples challenged the tripartite definition of the traditional knowledge, and fundamentally changed the characteristics of the contemporary epistemology. However, this paper considers that the high evaluation of the meaning of Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because 1. The JTB definition is neither an important nor an overall one of knowledge. Besides, Gettier counter-examples has no universal but limited meaning. 2. The source of Getter counter-examples lies in one arbitrarily decision, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and the misunderstanding of JTB definition.

关 键 词：葛梯尔反例 意义 诘难 

分 类 号：B815.3[哲学宗教—逻辑学]