阿罗不可能性定理的几个等价形式  

The Equivalent Forms on Arrow Impossibility Theorem

作　　者：姚海祥[1,2] 易建新[1,2] 李仲飞[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学数学系,广州510631 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广州510000

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2004年第5期59-61,共3页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(10171115);教育部人文社会科学基金研究"十五"规划基金资助项目(01JA630009)

摘　　要：在这篇短文中,给出了关于社会福利函数F的防止策略性操纵的概念,并且证明了如果备选对象至少有三个,则下面结论是相互等价的:(1)F满足Pareto与IIA性质;(2)F满足Pareto与RID性质;(3)F是独裁的;(4)F是满的、正向响应的;(5)F是防止策略操纵的且F是满的。In this paper, we introduce the strategy-proof for social welfare functions. Then we prove that for any social welfare function F, whose range contains more than two alternatives and preference profile consists of strict preferences, the following statements are equivalent: (1)F has the Pareto property and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives; (2)F has the Pareto property and satisfies the RID; (3)F is dictatorial; (4)F is positively responsive and surjective; (5)F is strategy-proof and surjective.

关 键 词：社会福利函数 独裁 防止策略性操纵 正向响应 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]