国有商业银行委托代理风险分析  

Risk Analysis of State-owned Commercial Banks Based on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：石汉祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《中国软科学》2004年第10期36-40,58,共6页China Soft Science

摘　　要：本文主要运用委托代理理论对国有商业银行产权代理风险、上下级代理风险、银企代理风险进行了分析,指出了国有商业银行风险的成因。本文认为双重代理目标导致国有商业银行经营行为的异化、绩效评价的虚化和激励约束不足;代理层次过多导致国有商业银行代理效率损耗、内部人控制和成本外溢。本文还分析了银企信息不对称现象和预算软约束及银企双方的激励约束机制。Based on entrusted agency theory, this paper analyzes the agency risk of property right, the agency risk of superior and subordinate, the agency risk of bank and enterprise, and points out the cause of risk in state-owned commercial banks. It puts forward that the dual objectives of agency leads to the operating deviation of state-owned commercial banks, the falsity of performance estimate and the insufficient of incentive restriction. And excessive levels of entrusted agency will lead to the decrease of agency efficiency, the control by inner people and the spillover of cost. It also analyzes the info asymmetry in banks and enterprises, soft budgetary control and their incentive restriction mechanism.

关 键 词：银行风险 委托代理关系 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F752.7[经济管理—国际贸易]