关于输配电企业对多类型用户的定价管制模型  

THE INCENTIVE MODEIS OF REGUIATED PRICE FOR POWER TRANSMISSION ENTERPRISES WITH MULTI-TYPE CONSUMERS

作　　者：王先甲[1] 梁劲[1] 周静[2] 周策[3] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430072 [2]武汉大学电气工程学院,湖北武汉430072 [3]国家电力公司,北京100031

出　　处：《中国电机工程学报》2004年第10期40-44,共5页Proceedings of the CSEE

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(60274048);湖北省自然科学基金项目(2001ABB047)~~

摘　　要：由于输配电领域属于垄断经营,具有操纵电价的市场力,应对其进行严格的价格管制。然而管制者在监管时面对着双重的信息不对称,一方面是理性的垄断企业不会主动揭示自己的真实成本,通过虚报成本来影响管制者决策以便提高电价,另一方面管制者不能有效甄别地消费者类型,这种信息不对称会困扰管制者的决策。该文从激励性机制设计的角度出发,建立了旨在暴露企业的真实成本和有效甄别不同消费者类型的模型,并得出了一些有意义的结论。It is necessary for the over price sectors of power transmission and distribution to be regulated by the government due to the quality of natural monopoly, which have market power to control price. However, the regulator is always faced with doubly asymmetric information, in other words, regulator has incomplete information about a monopolist’s cost, while can’t identify consumer types. Throughout incentive mechanism design, this paper set up model that can reveal enterprise’s authentic cost successfully and make out consumer types effectively and it also gives some significant conclusions.

关 键 词：管制 输配电企业 真实成本 电价 定价 信息不对称 甄别 模型 用户 揭示 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]