竞争环境下多个风险规避销售商的供需链协调  

Supply chain coordination with competion between multiple risk aversion retailers

作　　者：储洪胜[1] 索寒生[1] 王京春[1] 金以慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学自动化系,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2004年第10期1345-1347,1351,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60174046)

摘　　要：针对供需链上具有独立决策权的各个实体由于决策激励不一致导致供需链低效的问题,论文以一个两阶段的供需链系统为背景,研究了销售商之间存在竞争和其风险规避态度对供需链协调性的影响。求出了在这种情况下的Nash均衡解,得出竞争使得销售商的总订货量上升,风险规避使得总订货量下降。证明了竞争的存在使得风险规避效应对供需链协调性的影响削弱,从而简单的批发价合同可以使得供需链协调。Supply chain inefficiencies can result from incompatible incentives provided by independent decision-makers. This paper studies the combined impact of competition and retailer's risk aversion attitude on the coordination of a two-stage supply chain. When the system reaches Nash equilibrium, the whole system's optimal order quantity increases as the degree of competition increases but decreases as the risk aversion increases. Moreover, competition weakens the effect of risk aversion on coordination of the decentralized system,hence, the supply chain can achieve coordination with a simple wholesale price contract.

关 键 词：博弈论 供需链合同 竞争 风险规避 协调 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TP14[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]