信息成本、不完全契约与农村金融机构设置——从农户融资视角的分析  

Information Cost, Incomplete Contract and Rural Financial Institutions Arrangement

作　　者：周脉伏[1] 徐进前[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东农业大学经济管理学院,中国人民大学农经系 [2]北京语言大学金融系

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2004年第5期38-43,共6页China Rural Survey

摘　　要：农户融资难的事实表明 ,现有正规金融机构对农户融资的交易费用高昂 ,难以满足农户的融资要求。本文运用信息成本理论和契约理论对此进行了分析。认为产生这一问题的原因是现有金融机构距离农户较远 ,导致其对农户融资信息成本高昂 ,以及自履约实施机制的缺乏。解决农户融资难问题 ,必须从农户缺乏抵押和担保这一硬约束出发 ,安排贴近农户的金融机构 ,以降低信息不对称的程度 ,并充分利用人际信任和自履约机制 ,从而减少金融机构和农户间的交易费用。It is difficult for rural households to be financed, which shows that the transaction cost is pretty high between the existing formal financial institutions and the rural households, and that it is difficult to meet the need of the rural households. This paper analyzes the issue by using the theory of information cost and that of incomplete contract. It is thought that this issue results from the fact that financial institutes are relatively far away from the rural households, which causes high cost for the rural households to get financed and shortage of self-enforcement mechanism. Based on the fact that ruralhouseholds lack of pledge and guarantee, rural financial institutions must be located close to rural households so as to save information cost and make full use of the self-enforcement mechanism.

关 键 词：农户 融资 信息成本 不完全契约 农村 金融机构 

分 类 号：F830.6[经济管理—金融学]