进化博弈论视角下的制度分析理论  

Theory of Institutional Analysis in the perspective of Evolutional Game Theory

作　　者：黄玉捷[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海市人口与发展研究中心

出　　处：《学术月刊》2004年第10期66-72,共7页Academic Monthly

摘　　要：进化博弈论在制度分析中有几个突出的成果:其一,萨格登、扬、青木昌彦等人运用进化博弈论的演进稳定策略概念及内生博弈规则论证了制度的内生性,较好地避开了新制度经济学曾经遇到的制度循环论证问题;其二,青木昌彦通过对不同的域之间的嵌入与捆绑的讨论探讨了制度具有耐久性的原因,论证了制度的关联与互补特性;其三,扬和青木昌彦从博弈均衡的概念出发提出了制度演进过程的“断续均衡效应”和“刻点均衡”特性;其四,青木昌彦和扬提出了制度的多种均衡问题,并通过主观博弈模型和随机稳定策略分别论证了不同文化背景下制度出现多样性的可能性。There are several outstanding achievements of evolutional game theory in institutional analysis. Firstly, Sugdan, Young and Okazaki have expounded the endogenous nature of institution by applying the conception of evolutionary stable strategy in evolutional game theory as well as the rules of endogenous game, and avoided in a better way the problem of institutional circulating analysis once the new institutional economics met with. Secondly, Okazaki expounds and proves the characteristics of linkage and mutual complement by a discussion on the cause which led institutional endurance through expounding the inserting and combining between different domains. Thirdly, Young and Okazaki put forward a 'punctuated equilibrium effect' and the characteristics of 'time-alternative equilibrium' in the process of institutional evolution based on the conception of game equilibrium. Fourthly, Okazaki and Young put forward the problem of multi-equilibrium of institution, and expounded respectively the probability of institutional multiplicity e-merged in different cultural background through subjective game model and random strategy of stability.

关 键 词：进化博弈论 制度分析理论 经济数学模型 青木昌彦 制度循环论证 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]