寡头垄断和排污权初始分配  

Oligopoly and Initiate Allocation of Emission Right

作　　者：陈德湖[1] 李寿德[1] 蒋馥[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程》2004年第10期51-53,共3页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70273021)

摘　　要：排污权交易政策受到世界各国普遍关注的环境政策之一。在实施排污权交易时,最大的争议莫过于排污权的初始分配方法。在市场不完全竞争的情况下,如果企业的初始排污权配置不当,排污权交易的治理效率会由于垄断效应而降低。本文研究了产品市场是寡头垄断,排污权交易对寡头垄断市场的影响,并进一步研究了管理部门可以通过有效地分配排污权来减少社会福利的损失。The environmental policy of tradable emission rights is common considered by all of the countries in the world. (During) implementing the policy, the most arguable things are the initiate allocation of emission rights. Under conditions of imperfect competition, if firms are improperly allocated the initiate emission right, the efficiency of pollution control will be decreased because of monopoly. This paper researched how tradable emission right influences oligopoly market and further (researched) that administrators can efficiently allocate emission rights to firms in order to reduce the lose of social welfare, (when) products market is monopolized by oligopoly firms.

关 键 词：环境政策 排污权交易 寡头垄断 初始分配 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]