上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性研究  

A Study on the Compensation Performance Sensitivity of General Managers in Listed Companies

作　　者：肖继辉[1] 彭文平[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632 [2]华南师范大学管理学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《财经研究》2004年第12期34-43,52,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章分析了公司的收益波动、公司财务杠杆、公司规模、董事会治理、大股东治理、经理自利特征对我国上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性的影响,发现前五个特征对报酬业绩敏感性无显著影响,但是总经理的双重身份、董事身份和其在董事会中任期这三个经理自利特征对报酬业绩敏感性有显著影响;更重要的发现是,当公司业绩变好时报酬业绩敏感性增加,当公司业绩下滑时报酬业绩敏感性减小,而总经理双重身份和其在董事会中任期这两个经理自利特征使报酬业绩敏感性进一步降低。Analysing the effects of the characteristics of earnings fluctuation of a company, finance leverage of a company, company scale, board governance, block shareholder governance and managerial entrenchment on compensation performance sensitivity of the general managers in listed companies in China, we find that the first five characteristics do not have obvious influences on compensation performance sensitivity, while the three managerial entrenchment characteristics as the dual status of the general manager, the status of board member and his term in the board have evident influences on compensation performance sensitivity. An even more important finding is that when the corporate's performance becomes better, the compensation performance sensitivity increases, while the corporate's performance worsens, the compensation performance sensitivity decreases, and the two managerial entrenchment characteristics as the dual status of the general manager and his term in the board will further decrease the compensation performance sensitivity.

关 键 词：报酬业绩敏感性 董事会治理 大股东治理 经理自利 

分 类 号：F404[经济管理—产业经济]