倾销边际与损害边际反倾销效应分析  

Antidumping Game of Dumping Margin and Injury Margin

作　　者：杨仕辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北大学商学院,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《管理科学》2004年第6期57-61,共5页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(02BJL050);国家教育部人文社会科学"十五"规划基金资助项目(01JA790021)

摘　　要：建立了一个由企业内生选择决定贸易保护水平的不完全竞争二阶段动态反倾销博弈模型,分析了倾销边际与损害边际反倾销税对企业行为的影响,发现倾销边际反倾销税的企业战略动机与损害边际反倾销税的企业激励动机的差异,倾销边际反倾销税在保护本国产业发展方面要优于损害边际反倾销税。In this paper we develop a dynamic two-period anti-dumping model of imperfect competition to analyze the effects of dumping margin duties and injury margin duties on firm behavior under the level of protection which is endogenously determined by the firms involved. We find the strategic motive of firms under dumping margin duties may run in the opposite direction compared to the incentives for firms provided under injury margin duties. Dumping margin duties perform better than injury margin duties in terms of protecting domestic industries.

关 键 词：倾销边际 损害边际 反倾销税 

分 类 号：F74[经济管理—国际贸易]