特许权合约中政府的收入担保水平分析  

Government's guarantees on revenue level in concession contracts

作　　者：于国安[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《河海大学学报（自然科学版）》2004年第6期707-711,共5页Journal of Hohai University(Natural Sciences)

摘　　要：在特许权合约设计中,当政府对特许权企业的收入水平进行担保时,由于单位政府财政资金的成本总是大于零,当担保产生的消费者剩余增加不能大于因担保支付的财政资金成本时,社会福利水平就会降低.因此,政府担保水平的确定,需要权衡消费者剩余和财政资金成本.笔者将特许权合约看作一个委托代理框架下的报酬合约,通过利用动态博弈中的逆推归纳法,对在政府担保水平最优条件下特许权人为风险中性的特许权合约进行分析,指出特许权项目的用户付费定价取决于财政资金成本和产品需求弹性.In design of concession contracts, the government sometimes provides guarantees for concessionaires on their revenue. If the increment of consumers, surplus produced by government's guarantees is less than the expenditure of the guarantees, the social welfare will reduce. So it is necessary to balance the surplus of consumers and the cost of public funds in determination of the level of guarantees. In this paper, the concession contract is taken as a payment contract under a framework of principal-agent theory, and an analysis is made on the concession contract under optimal guarantee level with risk-neutral concessionaires by use of the backward induction method in dynamic game theory. Finally, it is pointed out that the fee rate to users should depend on the shadow cost of public funds and price elasticity of goods.

关 键 词：特许权 合约 政府担保 消费者剩余 财政资金 企业 成本 社会福利 水平 人为风险 

分 类 号：TV213.4[水利工程—水文学及水资源] F832[经济管理—金融学]