欧盟东扩后欧洲汇率机制Ⅱ面临的挑战及其影响  

Challenges to European Exchange Rate Mechanism II and Their Effects after EU Eastern Enlargement

作　　者：胡勇[1] 陈亚温[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学系

出　　处：《欧洲研究》2004年第6期63-76,共14页Chinese Journal of European Studies

摘　　要：欧盟东扩后,加入欧洲汇率机制Ⅱ(ERM-Ⅱ)的国家也会扩大。虽然ERM-Ⅱ比ERM-Ⅰ更有弹性,可以使新成员国有更大的灵活性来维持汇率稳定,促进趋同标准的实现,但ERM-Ⅱ并不是对称的体系,它可能存在的问题是:没有在欧洲中央银行与新成员国之间建立实质性的合作机制,没有明确规定欧洲中央银行在协助新成员国稳定汇率时应承担什么样的干预义务。ERM-Ⅱ的一些制度性不足,可能使得新成员国在处理巴拉萨-萨缪尔森效应时要付出更多的成本,在应对投机冲击时力不从心。在现有制度安排下,减小ERM-Ⅱ不稳定性风险的可行办法就是提高加入ERM-Ⅱ成员国的质量,即尽可能使新成员国在基本完成相应的经济改革与结构调整之后,在基本实现趋同标准之后,再考虑加入ERM-Ⅱ。Along with the eastern enlargement of the EU, the members within European exchange rate mechanism Ⅱ ( ERM Ⅱ) will also increase. ERM Ⅱ is more flexible than ERM Ⅰ in having new members to keep their exchange rates stable and to reach Convergence Criteria. Nevertheless, the mechanism is an asymmetric one and may has problems such as lacking substantive cooperation between the ECB and the new entrants , and short of clearly defined rules concerning the obligations of European Central Bank to intervene so that could help the new members to stabile their exchange rates against the Euro. The institutional weakness of ERM Ⅱ may not only increase the cost of new members when dealing with Balassa-Samuelson effect, but also weaken their capability to encounter speculative attacks. Within present institutional framework, a practical way for new members to reduce risks is to strengthen their ca- pacities, that is, to join ERM Ⅱ only when they have completed economic reforms and structural adjustments, and have met Convergence Criteria.

关 键 词：成员国 ERM 汇率机制 欧洲中央银行 欧盟东扩 投机冲击 萨缪尔森 承担 国家 实质性 

分 类 号：F835[经济管理—金融学]