一个具有最小泄漏的可公开验证M+1电子拍卖  

A publicly verifiable (M+1)-st auction with minimal leakage

作　　者：伍前红[1] 姜正涛[1] 袁素春[1] 王育民[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学ISN国家重点实验室,陕西西安710071

出　　处：《通信学报》2005年第1期12-16,共5页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家"973"重大基金资助项目(G19990358-01);国家自然科学基金资助项目(60073052)

摘　　要：目前绝大多数电子拍卖方案中,如果第三方勾结,那么投标者的标价不再保密。但是,对于 M+1 拍卖,在任何情况下保持标价的秘密性是非常重要的,因为标价反映了投标者对商品的真实评价,它们很可能是投标者重要的商业秘密。文章提出这样一种 M+1 拍卖,泄漏的只是中标价,其余标价及其相互关系在任何勾结情况下都是保密的,而且,标价的正确性可以公开验证,方案的效率远远高于最近 Brandt 提出的方案。方案具有兼容性,支持第一价位拍卖、Vickrey 拍卖和一般的 M+1 拍卖。In the most of existing cryptographic auctions, the bidders’ bids no longer remain confidential if the third parts collude. However, for (M+1)-st auctions, keeping the bids secret in any case is vital to the bidders because the bids are their true evaluations of the commodities and these evaluations may be their critical commercial secrets. This paper proposes cryptographic (M+1)-st auctions meeting such requirements. The only leakage is the selling price while the other bids and their relation keep confidential in any collusion. The scheme is more efficient than the recently proposed scheme due to Brandt. Our proposal enjoys compatibility with supporting the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and generic (M+1) -st auction.

关 键 词：M+1密封拍卖 安全多方计算 零知识证明 隐私保护 

分 类 号：TB11[理学—数学]