关于均衡审计市场的研究——对一个无限重复博弈模型的分析  

A Study of Equilibrium Auditing Market Analysis on an Infinite Repeated Game Model

作　　者：王霞[1] 王镇蒙[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2005年第2期88-97,109,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：目前利用博弈模型对均衡审计市场的研究还主要集中在管理者与注册会计师的博弈,而对投资人与注册会计师的博弈却很少触及。文章建立了投资人与注册会计师间无限重复博弈模型,并在四种条件下分别求解模型的纳什均衡,由此得到两组合作均衡与两组非合作均衡;此外,通过建立触发战略,获得投资人与注册会计师由非合作均衡路径转移到合作均衡路径所需要的最短时间。文章的结论是,审计市场有有效的一面,也有失灵的一面。为保护投资人与注册会计师的利益,应系统地从加强对注册会计师的监管、重建诚信体制等多方面入手,使博弈快速回归合作均衡路径。Nowadays,researches on the equilibrium auditing market,still focus on the game between managers and CPAs, while few has been done on the game between investors and CPAs. Thus this paper establishes an infinite repeated game between these two market players, and solves the Nash equilibriums under four different conditions respectively, then gains two cooperating equilibriums and two non-cooperating equilibriums. In addition, through building trigger strategies, the shortest time lag of the transition from non-cooperating equilibriums path to cooperating equilibriums path between investors and CPAs is obtained. Finally, we can conclude that: auditing market is effective on some aspects, but failed on the others to some extent. In order to protect the interests of investors as well as CPAs, we should enhance the supervision of CPAs, and rebuild system of honesty and trustworthiness in order to accelerate the change of the model's equilibrium from non-cooperating path back to cooperating path as fast as possible.

关 键 词：审计市场 无限重复博弈 监管 诚信体制 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]