风险投资中道德风险的信息化处理方案  

The Resolution of Moral Hazard with an Informationized Methodin Venture Capital

作　　者：张凯[1] 韩轶[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川电子科技大学管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2005年第1期38-40,共3页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(79900022&70372032)

摘　　要：风险投资是一种新兴的、迅速发展并有巨大增长潜力的企业,尤其是高科技企业,提供股权投资以获取高资本收益的投资行为。正如我国其它类型的企业一样,在风险资本运行的过程中,也会产生明显的委托代理关系,从而对高科技企业的治理结构及其治理机制安排产生影响。以往和现在的许多文献都是从契约的角度来降低由于信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险。本文从信息化的角度对风险投资的委托代理关系做一些探讨。Venture capital is an investment behavior that through investing in such enterprises that are rising quickly and have potentiality to develop, especially in high-tech enterprises, investors are offered right of stocks to gain high profits. Just as other types of enterprises, there is the principal-agent relation in the operation process of venture capital, and it has an effect on the arrangement of governance structure and governance mechanism in enterprises. The study of many previous literatures is that they focus on decreasing adverse selection and moral hazard due to information asymmetry from the angle of contract. This paper probes into principal-agent relation in venture capital from the informationized angle.

关 键 词：风险投资 信息不对称 模式 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]