少数股权控股的非效率性及再融资方式选择  

Non-efficiency of CMS and Choice on Way of Refinance

作　　者：马晓军[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融学系,天津300071

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2005年第3期30-34,F003,共6页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：少数股权控股是常见的控股形式,主要包括多种投票权安排、金字塔控股和交叉控股三种形式,它会降低公司运作的效率。我国上市公司中普遍存在少数股权控股问题。少数股权控股在项目选择、投资政策和公司规模的决定、控制权转让方面会引起非效率。运用减少少数股权控股代理成本的方法,引入债务约束机制,对效率具有提升作用。因此,在再融资方式选择方面,应鼓励其债务融资,限制其股权融资。Controlling minority structure is a usual structure in controlling companies, which has there main forms such as deferential voting rights, stock pyramid and cross ownership. CMS will cause the agency costs and therefore reduce the financial efficiency. This paper analyses the agency costs of CMS from there points such as project choice, investment policy and control transfer, then points out there ways to decrease agency costs, of which the debt's obligation mechanism is carefully discussed. The policy suggestion of this paper is to encourage debt or convertible refinance and restrict equity refinance for CMS companies.

关 键 词：少数股权控股 控制权 私人利益 再融资 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]