股票市场内幕交易规制的优化实施问题  

Stock Market:Optimal Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulation

作　　者：夏俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学管理与人文学院,北京100876

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2000年第1期17-20,36,共5页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：内幕交易导致股票市场资源配置效率降低 ,对其进行规制可以减小造市者的逆向选择问题。实施内幕交易规制涉及到规制成本 ,优化实施就是要在规制收益和实施成本间进行权衡 ,谋取最优实施方案。本文探讨在规制者为以调整资产组合为目的而交易的不知情投资者期望效用最大化的情况下 。Insider trading leads to low efficiency of resources allocation in stock market, and insider trading regulation can lessen market makers’ adverse selection problem Enforcement of insider trading regulation involves regulation cost, thereby optimal enforcement is to make a trade off between regulation revenue and cost This paper tries to explore the optimization problem of enforcement policy under the assumption that the regulator’s goal is to maximize the expected utility of uninformed investors who trade because of portfolio consideration

关 键 词：股票市场 内幕交易规制 优化实施 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]