国有银行改革中的自增强机制:提出与解读  

The Self-Reinforcing Mechanism in the Reform of China’s State-owned Bank: Present and Explain

作　　者：胡维波[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学新华金融保险学院,湖北武汉430060

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2004年第6期12-20,共9页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

摘　　要：当前国有银行改革存在利益沾滞并陷入了胶着状态 ,已被锁定于低效的劣等均衡 ;内生于经济、金融制度变迁过程中的政府行政干预机制是国有银行改革的最大阻力 ,也是国有银行改革掉入陷阱的诱因。因此 ,破除行政干预机制 ,尽快转变政府职能是其他各项改革成功推进的前提 ,也是提升整体经济素质的前提 ;而培育良好的市场环境、提供及时准确的信息引导、做一个“客户导向型”政府 ,则是政府职能在经济领域的集中体现。The main view of the paper involves: first, at present, the state-owned bank reform involves interest stickiness. The reform has already fallen into deadlock, and also been locked in the inferior and inefficient equilibrium. Second, the government administrative interference in the course of financial institution reform is the greatest obstacle in the state-owned bank reform, also the inducement that make the state-owned bank reform fall into the trap. Removing the government administrative interference , changing government function as soon as possible are the premise of other reforms successfully move forward, also the premise of promoting the whole economic quality. Third, fostering the good market environment, offering the accurate information guidance in time, becoming a “customer leading”government are the embodiment of the government function in economic fields.

关 键 词：国有商业银行 中国 产权制度 改革 自增强机制 行政干预 政府职能 金融体制 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学] F832.1