不完全信息下道路客运市场质量招投标的监督博弈  

Monitoring games on road transport franchise bidding in incomplete information

作　　者：李建章[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通学院管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆交通学院学报》2005年第3期112-117,共6页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University

摘　　要：笔者在文中使用博弈论的方法分析了道路客运市场质量招投标中关于中标企业在不完全信息下的静态博弈监督机制,得到了混同的、分离的和准分离的贝叶斯均衡策略.然后建立了完全但不完美信息动态博弈模型和包括投标策略的两阶段不完全信息动态博弈模型,前者只有分离均衡.但在不完全信息下,当低效率运输企业的概率较低且它在中标时只要偷懒能获得足够大的利润,就有混同均衡,即低效率企业能冒充高效率企业在运输线路质量招投标中投出超过自身运营能力的高质量运输服务,然后执行低质量以获得其投机收益.The monitoring mechanism on road transport franchise bidding has been invesgated by Game theory.In incomplete information static game model, the equilibrium strategy indicate that the higher the probability that the transport firm is lower efficiency is, the bigger the mornitoring strength adopted by the government is. The complete but imperfect information dynamic game model has onlyone perfect Bayesian equilibrium-separating equilibrium,which means that the lower efficiency firm can not mimic the higher efficiency firm's strategy.If the probability that the transport firm is lower efficiency is smaller,there exists a pooling equilibrium for the incomplete information dynamic game model.

关 键 词：运输市场 质量招标 监督策略 不完全信息下的静态博弈 不完全信息动态博弈 贝叶斯均衡 完美贝叶斯均衡 混同均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学] U116.1[交通运输工程]