宗族在村治权力分配与运行中的影响分析  

作　　者：肖唐镖[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西行政学院政治学教研部,江西南昌330003

出　　处：《投资与建设》2002年第3期1-6,共6页

基　　金：国家"九五"哲学社会科学规划项目 (98BZZ0 1 4)

摘　　要：在 1 999年直选前 ,村干部的选任虽然通过乡政“任命”或“指选”这只“看得见的手”来完成 ,但还有另一只“看不见的脚”在起作用 :宗族通过实力原则、裙带传承、亲缘网络等方式影响村治权力的分配。由于宗族背景的不同 ,村干部所享有的权力分量及其工作方式与方法也受到影响。因此 ,宗族依然是不可忽视的基础性权力资源 ,它正在以新的机制和方式影响着村治权力的分配与运行 。Before the direct election practiced in 1999, although the election of village cadres was accomplished through the visible means of appointing and assigning, an invisible factor was playing a role-- patriarchal clans were affecting the distribution of the ruling power through their influence, nepotism and relation networks. Furthermore, the amount of power enjoyed by the cadres and their working manners and methods were also affected owing to the different backgrounds of patriarchal clans. Therefore, the patriarchal clan is an unnegligible fundamental power resource, which is affecting distribution and operation of the village ruling power in new forms and is interacting with state powers.

关 键 词：村干部 “看得见的手” 权力分配 权力 方式 影响分析 机制 实力 基础性 互动 

分 类 号：F325.4[经济管理—产业经济]