防洪保险的资本约束及其解决途径  

Analysis of capital constraints in flood insurance and solution measures

作　　者：吴秀君[1] 王先甲[1] 楚扬杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学水利水电学院

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（工学版）》2005年第1期100-103,共4页Engineering Journal of Wuhan University

基　　金：国家科技攻关计划(2002BA901A37)

摘　　要：从标准的可保性条件(逆向选择、道德风险和不精确的大损失)出发得出了洪水保险失败的根本原因在于资本约束.从解决资本约束的角度得出了洪水保险要重回市场的条件:从保险公司内部的保费定价、资金积累等,到外部的投资主体及一系列法律、制度等外部环境的支持来解决资金不匹配的问题.The paper examines the causes of the failure of private market for flood insurance and examines some public solutions. Although the standard explanations of insurance market failure (adverse selection and moral hazard, large imprecise risks) are presented, we argue that the primary explanation for the failure of this market lies in the inability of insurance companies to arrange for the level of capital necessary to settle a large loss. Most of researches suggest that flood insurance should be operated by government due to the uninsurable flood risk, while we argue that if the accounting, tax and regulatory advantages enjoyed by these schemes were made available to the private sector, private corporations would be likely to reenter this market.

关 键 词：洪水保险 不可保风险 资本约束 

分 类 号：TV87[水利工程—水利水电工程] F840.64[经济管理—保险]