沟通行动具备独立性与优先性吗?——试论哈贝马斯言语行为理论  

Is Communicative Action Independent and Original?——Tentatively on the problem of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action

作　　者：周濂[1] 

机构地区：[1]香港中文大学哲学系

出　　处：《求是学刊》2005年第2期26-31,共6页Seeking Truth

摘　　要：哈贝马斯的沟通行动理论旨在区分沟通理性和工具理性 ,而这一区分的关键在于能否有效地区分以言行事行为和以言取效行为 ,特别是能否证明以言行事行为独立于并且优先于以言取效行为。文章指出 ,哈贝马斯对这个根本问题的论证并不特别令人信服 ,在此意义上 ,哈贝马斯所构筑的沟通行动理论就存在根基不牢的危险。The aim of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is to distinguish the communicative rationality from the instrumental rationality, which turns out to be the case only if it can be shown that the distinction between illocutionary acts and perlocutinary acts is clear, Moreover, illocutionary acts are not only one kind of independent acts but also more original than perlocutionary acts. In this paper, I will argue that the justification Habermas offers is not so convincing, therefore, there are many fundamental fallacies in Habermas’ theory of communicative action.

关 键 词：沟通行动 策略行动 以言行事行为 以言取效行为 有效性宣称 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]