个人所得税逃税、隐性就业及其治理  

Income Tax Evasion, Hidden Employment and the Governance Concerned

作　　者：许雄奇[1] 符涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工学院经济学系,重庆400050

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2005年第1期54-57,共4页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

摘　　要：课征个人所得税会影响劳动力的供给。一般来说,累进所得税会减少劳动供给,使劳动者实际收入降低,因此个人所得税逃税现象相当普遍。低报所得以非法逃税面临高稽查率和罚款率,故转向地下经济活动通过隐性就业方式间接逃税是理性个人的必然选择。但是,这会给经济的正常运行带来巨大的负面影响。根据劳动者选择以隐性就业方式逃税的经济机理分析,提出相应的政策措施以治理所得税逃税和隐性就业。Imposition of an income tax has an impact upon the labor power. Generally speaking, a progressive income tax may cut down labor supply and reduce a laborer’s real income. Thus, tax evasion seems to be a ubiquitous trend. Tax evasion by reporting income less than the actual one may be easily discovered and is punishable by a fine. As such, it is natural for a smart laborer to turn to underground economic activities to reduce his tax liability indirectly by way of hidden employment. Definitely, such an act will bring about great adverse effects upon the function of economy. This paper, based on an analysis of the economic mechanism of tax evasion by hidden employment, proposes that certain policies and countermeasures should be taken and carried out to crack down income tax evasion and hidden employment.

关 键 词：隐性就业 逃税现象 个人所得税 供给 实际收入 地下经济 稽查 劳动者 根据 普遍 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学] F812.42[经济管理—财政学]