论税率、政府支出与税收监管对逃税行为的影响  

Effect of Tax Rate, Government Expenditure and Taxation Supervisor on Tax Evasion

作　　者：刘华[1] 霍景东[2] 刘锦源[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京100102

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（城市科学版）》2005年第1期6-7,12,共3页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70173003).

摘　　要：在纳税人为理性的假定下,以拉姆齐无限期家庭效用函数和AK生产模型为工具,推出了家庭的最优税率,并分析了政府支出效率对最优税率的影响.此外,利用代表性家庭的期望收入函数得到了使其终身效用最大化的最优所得申报比率.通过讨论,发现制定合理的税率、提高政府支出效率比加大稽查力度和惩罚力度更有效.Under the assumption that tax payers are rational, Ramesey infinite-horizon household's utility function and AK Model are used to deduce the household's maximization tax rate, and the influence of government expenditure efficiency on maximization tax rate is analysed. The household's expected income function is applied to deduce the maximization income declaration ratio which maximizes its lifetime utility. By discussion, it is found that making a rational tax rate and enhancing the efficiency of government expenditure are more effective than strengthening the supervision and punishment.

关 键 词：税率 政府支出 税收监管 逃税 

分 类 号：F810.422[经济管理—财政学]