银商之争的经济学分析:从沃尔玛诉讼案到中国的罢刷事件  

Risk Analysis of Stock Market: Form Walmart Lawsuit Case to Refuse Attentdance Check

作　　者：骆品亮[1] 何之渊[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2005年第2期20-23,共4页Shanghai Management Science

基　　金：上海市高校优秀青年教师后备人选科研项日(03YQHB014)复旦大学文科科研推进计划金穗项目(03JS013)资助

摘　　要：我国商家拒绝银行卡的罢刷行动与沃尔玛等商户集体诉讼Visa和Mastercard案均缘于商户、银行及银行卡组织的非合作博弈引发的利益冲突。本文在简单回顾银商之争历程后,从POS交易利益主体互动关系中剖析了银联组织的自然垄断特性及其造成的双重加价原理,并借鉴沃尔玛诉讼案的经验,基于产业组织理论从银联的结构性规制、银行卡市场的网络效应及价格听证等角度提出银商之争的若干解决思路。A combat between merchants and bank organization occurred in last year and provoked mass discussion in citizens and academia. Analogue to the case of class-action suit against Visa & MasterCard Co. leaded by Walmart, we find that conflict between merchants, issued bank and bank organization due to their uncooperative game is the main reason. This paper analysis the network effect and thus the characters of natural monopoly of bank organization, and the double markups of transaction fees setting by issued bank. This paper also give some suggestions for solutions to the combat between merchants and bank organization from the view point of the theory of industrial organization and the implications of the case of class-action suit against Visa& Master Card Co. . leaded by Walmart.

关 键 词：特约商户 商业银行 银行卡业务 刷卡消费 中国 自然垄断 零售业 POS交易系统 沃尔玛诉讼案 

分 类 号：F830.46[经济管理—金融学] F724.2