激励规制理论与商业银行监管  

Incentive Regulatory Theory and Regulation on Commercial Banks

作　　者：冉勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2005年第3期8-12,共5页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：激励规制理论认为,消除规制与被规制机构之间的信息不对称问题,关键是激励规制合同的建立要使两者的目标尽可能保持一致。激励规制理论在我国银行监管中的运用之一———事先承诺制的引入就较好地符合了这一要求,从而有助于提高监管效率,防范金融风险,促进社会福利最大化。The incentive regulatory theory holds that to eliminate the information asymmetry between regulator and the regulated institutions, the most important thing is to build the contract that will bring the two institutes' targets merging together. The pre-commitment approach is the practice of incentive regulatory theory in the financial regulatory region, and it has been proved that it is helpful to raise the efficiency of regulatory, and finally to add welfare of the society. This article explores the possible way for China to use this approach in the banking system regulation.

关 键 词：激励规制理论 商业银行 中国 银行监管 事先承诺制 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]