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作 者:孔珂[1] 解建仓[1] 岳新利[1] 陈鸿起[1]
机构地区:[1]西安理工大学水利水电学院,陕西西安710048
出 处:《水利学报》2005年第4期491-495,共5页Journal of Hydraulic Engineering
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助(50279041);国家"863"计划研究资助项目(2002AA113150)
摘 要:本文应用博弈论研究了水资源管理部门如何利用初始水权分配和水资源费对水市场进行有效的宏观调控,以实现水资源的优化配置。分析了市场经济条件下以水权和水市场为基础的水资源配置的过程。根据用水者在水市场上的行为特征,建立了以水资源总效益最大化为目标的两阶段动态博弈模型。给出了求解子博弈精炼纳什均衡条件下市场参与者的行动策略方法,从而得出管理机构相应的最优初始水权分配方案和水资源费率方案,并用算例阐明了建模的思路与方法。The games theory is applied to analyze the effectiveness of government organization in macroscopically controlling the water market in order to optimize the water resources allocation by utilizing the initial water rights allocation and water resources rate. The procedure of water resources deployment based on water rights and water market under the condition of market-oriental economy is analyzed. A two-stage dynamic game model regarding the most optimal income as the target is established according to the behavior characteristics of water users. The method for solving the market behavior strategies of water users in case of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is studied. On this basis, the optimal scheme of initial water rights allocation and water resources rate can be deduced consequently. An example is given to illustrate the idea of constructing and solving the model.
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