对城市拆迁中补偿标准的探讨  

Study on Compensation Standard of the Urban House Dismantlement Based on Game Theory

作　　者：户邑[1] 彭小兵[2] 刘贵文[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》2005年第6期133-135,共3页Journal of Chongqing University

基　　金：重庆市科委软科学研究项目(批准号:渝科发计字[2004]45号)

摘　　要：城市拆迁是中国近几年来的热点问题,拆迁补偿标准偏低被认为是引发拆迁纠纷的主要原因之一.通过建立开发商与被拆迁户两局中人博弈的模型,求解该博弈的混合策略纳什均衡,并分析提高补偿标准对纳什均衡的影响.研究表明,政府单纯出台提高补偿标准的政策,短期内可使被拆迁户受益,但长期的政策效果却降低了拆迁的发生率,减缓了旧城改造的步伐.It is a hot question in recent years in China about the urban house dismantlement and development, and the low compensation standard of the urban house dismantlement has been thought to be the main reason that cause dispute of the urban house dismantlement. After a two-player game model is built, the paper solves mix-strategy Nash equilibrium of game and analyzes the influence of improving compensation to game equilibrium. It is concluded that, if government only improve policy of compensation standard to issue, the resident ready to move with their house to be dismantled can enjoy the great benefit shortly, but the long-term policy result is to reduce the incidence of the urban house dismantlement and slow down paces that the old city transforms.

关 键 词：城市拆迁 补偿标准 博弈论 政策效果 

分 类 号：F299.23[经济管理—国民经济]