考虑佣金的关联价值拍卖模型  

Affiliated value model considering effect of commission

作　　者：毕志伟[1] 王彦[2] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学数学系,武汉430074 [2]武汉大学数学与统计学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2005年第3期24-27,80,共5页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70071012).

摘　　要：在标准的只考虑买卖双方的拍卖模型中引入第三方,拍卖公司.拍卖公司提供服务要收取一定的佣金,佣金费用由买家支付,支付额占成交价的比例为k.文章发现,佣金比例k的大小对买卖双方均有一定影响:买方的出价策略变得谨慎但是其均衡期望收益却与k无关;卖方的期望收益受到影响而降低.事实上,拍卖公司的佣金就是来自于卖方的期望收益中.文中就第一价格与第二价格机制在关联价值模型上讨论佣金问题,得到的结果有较普遍的意义.The auction company is induced as a third side in standard auction model which considers only bidders and seller. The auction company takes some commission from the winner of the auction. The main result is that the volume of the commission rate k has both effects on the bidder's bid strategy and the expected profits of the seller: bidder's bid becomes more passive but its expected profits is not dependent on the commission rate k; the seller's expected profit has really decreased. In fact, the commission obtained by auctioneer comes from the profit of the seller. With the affiliated value model that induced commission, this paper considers the strategy in the first_price auction and second_price auction.

关 键 词：拍卖 佣金比例 均衡期望收益 

分 类 号：F08[经济管理—政治经济学]