宪法裁判与民主的悖论  

The Paradox of Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy

作　　者：刘国[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学法学院,浙江杭州310028

出　　处：《现代法学》2005年第3期31-38,共8页Modern Law Science

摘　　要：当今许多国家为了维护民主纷纷建立了宪法裁判制度,然而也有些国家却为了民主不被侵害而拒绝宪法裁判。宪法裁判与民主的紧张自始至今从未消除,其实它们之间无矛盾性又无必然性,宪法裁判有助于民主,同时它也存在一定的民主风险。为发挥宪法裁判对民主的优长,应该运用法院的司法功能去避免其对民主的危害,这需要在宪法裁判与民主之间进行调适,恰当界定宪法裁判机关与立法机关之间的适当领域。对存在民主缺憾的国家来说,宪法裁判不失为至关重要的选择。Nowadays, many countries have set up a constitutional adjudication system to safeguard democracy. However, some others reject constitutional adjudication for fear that democracy should be harmed. From the very beginning till now, the tension between constitutional adjudication and democracy has never been eased. Indeed, no real conflict or necessity exists between them. Constitutional adjudication improves democracy although it can do just the opposite. To promote the former, we should exercise judiciary functions to shield democracy from being harmed. This needs to conciliate constitutional adjudication and democracy. Furthermore, the boundary between the judiciary and the legislature should be delineated appropriately. In this author’s opinion, for the countries that want democracy, constitutional adjudication may be an important choice after all.

关 键 词：民主 宪法 悖论 裁判制度 司法功能 立法机关 国家 矛盾性 法院 

分 类 号：D082[政治法律—政治学] D921