基于委托-代理关系的风险投资者对风险投资家激励模型的研究  

Study on the Incentive Model between the Venture Investor and the Venture Capitalist Based on the Principal-agent Relationship

作　　者：郑君君[1] 刘恒[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学商学院

出　　处：《数量经济技术经济研究》2005年第5期151-156,共6页Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

摘　　要：风险投资者与风险投资家之间存在一种委托-代理关系,风险投资家在项目的投资过程中起着关键性作用。制定一种显性的连续支付模式,对风险投资家起着一种极强的激励作用。要求风险投资家对项目注入一定的资本金,可有效防范风险投资家投资的草率行为,并能缩小投资者的代理成本。由此,本文构建了一种新的激励机制模型,为风险投资者建立合理的支付契约提供了依据。There is a kind of principal-agent relationship between the venture investor and the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist plays an important role in the venture investment. Designing a kind of apparent and continual compensation contract will make a good inspirited effect to the venture capitalist. Asking the venture capitalist to invest his own money to the venture project, this will hold back the capitalist's slapdash behavior and reduce the agent-cost. So the paper gives an incentive mechanism and mode. Based on the model, the venture investor can establish a reasonable compensation contract to the venture capitalist in the venture investment.

关 键 词：风险投资者 风险投资家 激励机制模型 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]