股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价  

Equity Separation, Government Regulations,and Chinese IPO Underpricing Puzzle

作　　者：刘煜辉[1] 熊鹏[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院金融研究所,100732 [2]北京色诺芬信息服务公司,100871

出　　处：《经济研究》2005年第5期85-95,共11页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：本文报告了中国市场异常高的IPO抑价。我们发现,经典文献关于IPO抑价的种种动机的假说在中国缺乏立论基础。中国市场“股权分置”和“政府管制”的制度安排是导致极高的IPO抑价的根本原因。“股权分置”扭曲了正常的市场利益机制,异化了IPO参与各方的行为方式,割裂了一、二级市场的套利行为。“政府管制”产生的寻租行为增加了一级市场投资者的成本,因此产生更高的IPO抑价。本文研究证实了,如果不解决影响市场正常运转的“股权分置”和过度“政府管制”问题,任何局部的、技术的IPO变革措施都不可能平抑一、二级市场的异常价差。This paper analyzes the abnormal IPO underpricing in China during the period between 1995 and 2003. We find standing theories developed in advanced ma rket have little power in explaining and predicting the behaviors of the players in the game. One new analytical framework based on institutional background of Chinese security market has been raised. Equity separate and government regulati ons in the IPO's process, which are both unique China Characteristics, are the m ain factors contributing to the underpricing in our studies. Some empirical evid ences are tested robustly in support of our hypothesis. One important political implication is suggested that government de-regulation and equal-equity-right will help increasing the market efficiency.

关 键 词：股权分置 政府管制 IPO抑价 寻租行为 政府管制 上市公司 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]