腐败与高薪养廉的经济学分析  

The Economics Analysis of Corruption and High Pay to Suppress Corruption

作　　者：王玉华[1] 梅云焕[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院法学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《山东工商学院学报》2005年第3期5-9,共5页Journal of Shandong Technology and Business University

摘　　要：通过建立政府官员和监督机构的博弈模型,利用经济学的基本原理,分析了工资水平对政府官员行为的影响、高薪能否达到养廉的目的以及如何才能达到这一目的等问题,认为单纯高薪不能养廉,要把高薪与权力资源、惩罚的确定性和监督的成本综合考虑。By establishing the game analysis between government officials and supervision organization, with the basic principle of the economics, the paper analyzed the effects of pay levels on government officials, whether the high pay could achieve the goal to suppress corruption and how to achieve the goal, it also considered the high pay and power resources, certainty of punishment and the cost of intendance.

关 键 词：博弈论 权力资源 监督 惩罚的确定性 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]