竞争性网络间的互联互通问题分析  

An Analysis of Competitive Telecom Network Interconnection

作　　者：廖成林[1] 李忆[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆市400044

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2005年第3期68-73,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：竞争性网络的运营商基于自身利益可能拒绝互通或合谋相互征收高额接入费,这两种行为都将损害消费者福利,因而需要政府规制。本文在考虑网络外部性、运营商的市场份额、市场容量和用户的转换成本等因素影响的基础上,通过构建一个包含"防降价均衡"机制的三阶段博弈模型来分析运营商的服务定价、互通决策、政府的接入费规制决策以及社会福利变化,发现存在合理的接入费区间使得运营商有动力互通且社会福利得到改善。<Abstrcat> The competitive telecom network operators may refuse interconnection or may collude in levying high access price because of their own profit.The government's regulation is necessary since both of the two kinds of conduct do harm consumers' welfare.Using a three-stage game theory model containing Undercut-Proof Equilibrium mechanism and some contribution factors such as network externalities,dominant (operator's) market share,market capacity,and users' switch cost,this paper analyzes the issues of telecom network interconnection,including (service) pricing,connection decision-making,access price regulation,and welfare change.It is concluded that there exists a rational section of access price,in which the telecom network operators will have impetus to interconnect each other and welfare will be improved.

关 键 词：电信网络竞争 互联互通 网络外部性 博弈 防降价均衡 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]