“高新技术——创业资本系统”发展过程的效益分析——毁损解策略情形  

Benefit Analysis about the HTVC Integration System's Development Process under Mutilation Solution Strategy

作　　者：侯合银[1] 王浣尘[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096 [2]上海交通大学系统工程研究所,上海200052

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2005年第3期138-143,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(79870052)

摘　　要：从毁损解策略出发,对双边道德风险情形下的高新技术-创业资本系统的发展过程进行了分析。具体地,分最大化企业家或创业资本家的期望绝对效益两种情况,严格证明了均衡契约;研究了均衡契约和系统组元的努力关于资本注入额度的单调关系;利用数值分析方法,描述了系统的整体期望效益(包括绝对效益和相对效益)关于资本注入额度的单调关系,并与其在整体解策略下的实现进行比较。<Abstrcat> From the mutilation solution's viewpoint,the HTVC system's development process is profoundly analyzed,when there is the double-sided moral hazard between entrepreneur and venture capitalist.Concretely,the equilibrium contracts are strictly proofed,according to maximizing the entrepreneur's expected absolute benefit or that of the venture capitalist;monotony relationship for equilibrium contracts and constituents' efforts about sunk capital amount are researched;By numerical analysis,the HTVC system's holistic expected benefit(concluding the absolute benefit and the relative one's monotony relationship with sunk capital amount are described,and its realization are separately compared with its realization under the holistic solution tactic.

关 键 词：高新技术-创业资本系统 对抗解策略 毁损解策略 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]