城市拆迁管理过程中利益共同体的合谋行为研究  

A study of conspiracy behavior of interests community in city demolition management

作　　者：户邑[1] 彭小兵[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《长春大学学报》2005年第3期71-75,共5页Journal of Changchun University

摘　　要：本文就城市拆迁中相关政府部门与开发商之间的合谋行为进行了理论研究,通过建立城市拆迁监管当局与开发商之间基于利益共同体的跨时博奕模型,分析了城市拆迁监管的部门特征及城市拆迁中反腐斗争的理论框架。基本的结论是,作为共谋利益的供给者,开发商存在两类行贿行为。政府拆迁主管部门的受贿行为也相应分为两类。并且,拆迁管理过程中合谋程度与政府主管部门权力介入市场的直接程度有关,能够直接决定拆迁收益的监管部门被侵蚀的可能性越大。<Abstrcat>The text makes a theorical study of the conspiracy behavior between the relevant government department and the developer in the city demolition.Through setting up the trans-epoch chess model based interests community between the supervision authorities of city demolition and developers,it analyses the department characteristic of city demolition supervision and the theorical frame of struggle against corruption in the city demolition.The basic conclusion is as the supplier conniving interests,the developer has two kinds of bribing behaviors.The bribing behavior in the chief department of the government demolition is divided into two kinds correspondingly too.And it has something to do with the complicity degree in the demolitional management and the direct degree of which the chief department of goverment gets involved in the market.It can determine directly the possibility that the supervision department of demolition income is corroded to be greatest.

关 键 词：城市拆迁 管理过程 共同体 行为研究 利益 政府主管部门 开发商 理论研究 政府部门 博奕模型 理论框架 监管部门 可能性 供给 市场 收益 

分 类 号：F426.471[经济管理—产业经济] D922.181[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]