拍卖投标中的卖方干扰策略分析  

Disturbance Strategy by Seller in Auction Games

作　　者：黄涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,100872

出　　处：《经济研究》2005年第7期90-95,共6页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：本文讨论了拍卖投标博弈中卖方通过代理人来干扰投标拍卖过程的两种策略,区分了买方不能辨别和能辨别卖方代理人类型的两种信息假定,由此讨论了卖方代理人对拍卖投标结果产生的影响,其结果是此时收益等价定理不再成立。这一模型可以用来解释现实中常常发生的一种卖方策略性行为。In this paper, two types of strategy the seller can use to disturb bidding process by an agent are introduced into auction games. Their impacts on the auctions are discussed under two information settings: undiscriminating case and discriminating case. It is showed that the result of revenue-equivalence-theorem does not hold on under the conditions. This model can be used to explain a strategic behavior of seller in reality.

关 键 词：卖方 投标 策略分析 干扰 策略性行为 拍卖过程 代理人 辨别 博弈 信息 买方 收益 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]