公司控制权转移中的控股股东行为分析与权利制约  

The Analysis of Controlling Shareholders Behavior on the Transfer of Corporate Control Right

作　　者：屠巧平[1] 刘爱菊[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南大学工商管理学院,河南开封475001

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2005年第7期65-68,共4页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：本文基于公司并购动机理论,揭示了我国控股股东行为的深层次原因,指出了市场制度缺陷较大和法律对投资者保护较弱,获取控制权私人收益的单位成本越低,控制权私人收益发生率越高,结果导致追求企业价值最大化的并购行为被扭曲,低效率的并购频繁发生。提出规范和制衡控股股东行为应从市场制度缺陷入手,从相应的法律制度规则设立入手。In the countries of having greater shortcoming of market system and having weaker investor protection, the unit cost of acquiring control benefits is reduced and the occuring rate of control benefits raised. It eventually caused that takeover behavior of pursuing value maximum was twisted and ineffective takeover frequently taked place.Therefore ,standardizing and balancing controlling stakeholders behavior should start with the shortcoming of market system and establishment of corresponding legal system.

关 键 词：控制权转移 控股股东 控制权收益 并购 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]